



HKIOEH Round Table:
Updates on Human Swine Influenza –
Facts and Strategies on Disease Control &
Prevention in Occupational Hygiene
Perspectives
9 July 2009

Ralph KY Lee Honorary Secretary HKIOEH





Influenza virus



Courtesy Inglis (1992)

A/H1N1 virus



Courtesy HPA (2009)

Influenza virus

- Orthomyxoviridae
- Spherical virions (80-120nm diameter)
- 2 major antigenic glycoproteins:
 - 🛿 Haemagglutinin (HA) (H1-16)
 - Neuraminidase (NA) (N1-9)
- Antigenic Drift
 - Change of genetic material due to lack of proofreading during replication
 - Responsible for annual epidemic
- Antigenic Shift
 - reassortment and merging of genetic materials from different influenza strains
 - novel viral subtype, most human lack immunity
 - Responsible for pandemics





Types of Influenza

- Ordinary / Seasonal Influenza
 Pandemic Influenza
 Occurrence
 - Cause
 - Severity

Common Human Influenza

- Influenza A (H3N2, H1N1)
- Influenza B
- Droplet transmission
- Typical Incubation Period (IP) 2-4 days with average of 2 days
- Symptoms: fever, headache, myalgia, running nose, cough, sore throat, usually subside in 2-7 days)

Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1)

- A respiratory disease of pigs regularly causes outbreaks of influenza among pigs
- Influenza virus was first isolated from pigs in 1930
- The H1N1 swine flu viruses are antigenically different from human H1N1 viruses and do not normally infect human
- First isolation of a swine influenza virus from a human occurred in 1974

Human Case of Swine Flu

From 1958 – 2005

- 50 cases of apparent zoonotic swine influenza virus infection
- 37 of which involved civilians and 13 of which involved military personnel
- Case-fatality rate of 14% (7 of 50 persons)
- 61% reported exposure to swine
- ~ 1/3 had probably or possible person-to-person transmission
- 33/37 (89%) H1N1; 4/37 (11%) H3N2

Myers KP, et al. Clin Infect Dis 2007;44:1084-8

Human Case of Swine Flu

- From Dec 2005 to Feb 2009
- 11 cases reported in US
- Triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses: Human, Avian, Swine
- Age: 16M to 48y
- 7 male 4 female
- Incubation period: 1-10d, Common 3-4d
- 8 had swine contact, 3 unknown

Myers KP, et al. Clin Infect Dis 2007;44:1084-8



Triple Reassortment



(Garten R et al. Scienceexpress 22 May 2009)



Clinical Features

Symptoms	H1N1 virus ^{1,2} (n= 175 - 642)	Seasonal flu ³ (n= 2470)	H5N1 ^{4,5} (n= 8 - 108)
Fever	92-94%	68 %	93-100 %
Cough	7 5-92 %	93 %	32- 100 %
Sputum	42%	NS	30- 76 %
Sore throat	66-79 %	84 %	25- <mark>71</mark> %
Diarrhea	25%	NS	7- <mark>70</mark> %
Vomiting	25-33%	NS	7-33%
Nasal congestion	66 %	91 %	17- <mark>58</mark> %
Malaise	78%	94 %	NS
Myalgia	62 %	91 %	1- 53 %
headache	77%	94 %	6- 100 %
Nausea	NS	NS	13%
Depressed consciousness	3%	NS	8- 50 %
SOB	24%	NS	9- 100 %
Conjunctivitis	15%	NS	NS

1. Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Investigation Team. N Engl J Med 2009;361. Epub ahead of print

HPA. Euro Surveill 2009;14:1-3

NS: Not stated Red: > 50%

3. AS Monto, et al. Arch Intern Med 2000;1603243-3247.

Kandun IN, et al. Lancet 2008; 372: 744–49.

5. The Writing Committee of the WHO Consultation on Human Influenza A/H5. N Engl J Med 2005;353:1374-85.

Mode of Transmission

- Most likely when in close proximity to infected pigs
 - Human-to-human transmission can occur through coughing or sneezing of people infected
 - By touching something with flu viruses on it and then touching mouth or nose
- Not transmitted by food
- Eating properly handled and cooked pork and pork products is safe

Infectivity and Transmissibility

- Incubation period appears to range from 1 to 7 days
 - Studies of viral shedding to define the infectious period are under way
- Secondary attack rate ~ 22 33% (c.f. 5 15% for seasonal flu)
- Reproductive ratio in the Mexico < 2.2 3.1 (c.f. 2 – 5 in 1918 pandemic, 1.3 for seasonal flu); may increase in successive wave(s) of spread





Global Situation

Global Situation

- WHO named the virus as influenza A (H1N1) virus
 - IN.B. the term human swine influenza (HSI) is used in HK to ease communication
- WHO declared the pandemic (i.e. phase 6) on 11 June 2009.
- According to WHO (as of 09:00 GMT, 7 July 2009), 94512 cases of confirmed HSI were reported, including 429 deaths.



26 April 2009: 2 countries, reporting 38 cases





27 April 2009: 4 countries, reporting 73 cases





© WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



Previous

Next

28 April 2009, 19:15 GMT: 7 countries, reporting 105 cases



@ WHO 2009, All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



Next

Previous





© WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



Next

Previous





© WHO 2009, All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer,



Next

Previous

01 May 2009, 23:30 GMT: 13 countries, reporting 367 cases



@ WHO 2009, All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



















© WHO 2009, All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.









© WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



Previous

Next





© WHO 2009, All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer,



Next

Previous





© WHO 2009, All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer,







@ WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



11 May 2009, 06:00 GMT: 30 countries, reporting 4694 cases





© WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer,



13 May 2009, 06:00 GMT: 33 countries, reporting 5728 cases



@ WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



Next

Previous

15 May 2009, 06:00 GMT: 34 countries, reporting 7520 cases

Netherlands Norway Canada Belgium 3 cases 2 cases 449 cases 1 case Sweden CODIes 1 death 2 cases UK USA 71 cases Finland 4298 cases 2 cases 3 deaths China Japan Ireland 4 cases Denmark 4 cases 1 case Mexico Cuba 1 case 2446 cases 3 cases France 60 deaths Poland 14 cases 1 case Guatemala Portugal 3 cases Germany 1 case Republic of Korea 12 cases **El Salvador** 3 cases Spain 4 cases Israel 100 cases 7 cases Costa Rica 8 cases Switzerland Thailand Austria 1 death 1 case 2 cases 1 case Panama Brazil Italy 40 cases 8 cases 9 cases Total: Australia Colombia 7520 cases Argentina New Zealand 1 case 65 deaths 10 cases 6,205 Khimahat 1 case 7 cases

© WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



20 May 2009, 06:00 GMT: 41 countries, reporting 10 243 cases

Previous Next



© WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



Next

Previous





@ WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.



Next

Previous





© WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer,









© WHO 2009. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer.

New Influenza A (H1N1), Number of laboratory confirmed cases as reported to WHO

Status as of 15 June 2009 06:00 GMT



Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Number of laboratory confirmed cases as reported to WHO

Status as of 06 July 2009 09:00 GMT



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. Data Source: World Health Organization Map Production: Public Health Information and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) World Health Organization



© WHO 2009. All rights reserved

Map produced: 06 July 2009 09:00 GMT




Daily Update of Local Situation As of 2:30 pm, 8 July 2009

Situation in Hong Kong

- The Emergency Response Level under the Government's Preparedness Plan for Influenza Pandemic is activated.
- There have been 1055 confirmed cases of human swine influenza (Influenza A/H1N1) since the first case was diagnosed on 1 May 2009.



- The cumulative number of patients tested positive for swine influenza is 1055
- On 7 July 2009, 41 patients tested positive for swine influenza.
- As at 2:30 pm 8 July 2009, a total of 584 cases have been discharged and 7 cases are still in hospital
- None required intensive care and there were no fatal cases.





(CHP, 2009)





(CHP, 2009)





What is Pandemic?



Endemic

stable pattern of occurrence of the disease.

Epidemic

occurrence of the disease greatly in excess of the expected rate.

Pandemic

worldwide spread of a disease, outbreaks or epidemics occurring in many countries & in most regions of the world

Previous Influenza Pandemics

Year	Subtype	Source	Result	
1918	H1N1 Spanish Flu	Swine & Birds	40–50 million death	
1957	H2N2 Asian Flu	Human & Birds	>2 million excess mortality	
1968	H3N2 Hong Kong Flu	Human & Birds	1 million excess mortality	

Prerequisites for the start of flu pandemic

- 1. Emergence of new Haemagglutinin subtype of influenza A virus
- 2. General population have no or little immunity
- 3. Cause human disease in a high proportion of people infected
- 4. Efficient human to human transmission



Hong Kong Government Response Systems

- The Government's plan includes a three-level response system:
 - Alert Response Level
 - Serious Response Level
 - Emergency Response Level
- Basing on different risk-graded epidemiological scenarios relevant to Hong Kong
- Designed to match with the World Health Organization (WHO)'s guideline for pandemic influenza planning.

Alert Response Level

- Alert Response Level depicts the scenarios of confirmation of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in poultry populations outside Hong Kong; confirmation of HPAI in Hong Kong in imported birds in quarantine, in wild birds, in recreational parks, in pet bird shops or in the natural environment.
- Upon the advice of the Director of Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation (DAFC), the Secretary for Food and Health (SFH) will activate this Response Level. 48

Alert Response Level (Con't)

- Another scenario depicts confirmation of human case(s) of avian influenza <u>outside</u> <u>Hong Kong.</u>
- SFH will activate this Response Level upon the advice of Director of Health (DoH).

Serious Response Level

- Serious Response Level depicts two possible scenarios:
 - The first scenario depicts confirmation of HPAI outbreaks in the environment of *or* among poultry population in <u>retail markets</u>, <u>wholesale markets</u> or <u>farms in Hong Kong</u> due to a strain with known human health impact. Upon the advice of DAFC or Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene, SFH will activate this Response Level.

Serious Response Level (Con't)

The second scenario depicts the <u>confirmation of</u> <u>human case(s)</u> of avian influenza in Hong Kong without evidence of efficient human-to human transmission. Upon the advice of DoH, SFH will activate this Response Level.

Emergency Response Level

Emergency Response Level depicts two possible scenarios:-

In the first scenario:-

- There is evidence confirming <u>efficient human-to-</u> <u>human transmission</u> of <u>novel influenza</u> occurring overseas or in Hong Kong.
- Efficient human-to-human transmission is defined as the ability of the virus to readily spread from person to person in the general population and cause multiple outbreaks of disease leading to epidemics.



• Clear evidence of human-to-human spread in the general population may be inferred when secondary cases result from contact with an index case, with at least one outbreak lasting over a minimum 2-week period in one country.



The second scenario under Emergency Response Level is pandemic influenza.

• The declaration of pandemic comes from WHO means the influenza strain is beginning to cause several outbreaks in at least one country, and spread to other countries, with consistent disease patterns indicating serious morbidity and mortality is likely in at least one segment of the population.



Risk Assessment...

- Increasing number of cases in many countries
- Based on the situation in Hong Kong
 - The virus has been widely circulating in Hong Kong and has become the dominant strain of influenza virus
 - Relatively mild disease
 - No report of severe / fatal case so far
 - No evidence for large-scale environmental transmission

 rate of evolution of human swine influenza virus no faster than other influenza virus



- The virus is sensitive to both oseltamivir and zanamivir
- Globally, most cases have been mild
- Vast majority of cases in all countries have occurred among adolescents and young adults
- Secondary household attack rates of new influenza A (H1N1) range from 22% to 33% (The rates of secondary attack of seasonal influenza range from 5% to 15%)



Monthly consultation rates of influenza-like illness reported by **General Out-patient Clinics (GOPC) and General Practitioners** (GP) 2008

Month	Rate (per 1000 consultations)				
	GOPC	GP			
Jan	3.8	47.0			
Feb	6.9	48.5			
Mar	8.6	64.2			
Apr	3.7	45.0			
May	3.0	44.6			
Jun	3.3	43.2			
Jul	4.8	43.7			
Aug	3.7	37.8			
Sep	3.4	38.2			
Oct	3.4	34.2			
Nov	3.8	34.3			
Dec	3.1	31.2			

Data Courtesy: CHP 57



Monthly consultation rates of influenza-like illness reported by General Out-patient Clinics (GOPC) and General Practitioners (GP) 2009

Month	Rate (per 1000 consultations)				
	GOPC	GP			
Jan	4.7	34.3			
Feb	5.8	49.8			
Mar	3.8	37.3			
Apr	2.8	37.4			
May	3.4	40.0			
Jun					
Jul					
Aug					
Sep					
Oct					
Nov					
Dec					

Data Courtesy: CHP 58



Monthly summary tables of influenza virus isolation 2009

Month	No. of specimens	No. of Isolates					
		A			ь	C	
		H3N2	H1N1	H5N1	H9N2		
Jan	3643	101	444	0	0	43	1
Feb	4108	162	883	0	0	24	2
Mar	3695	92	228	0	0	48	0
Apr	3388	45	45	0	0	27	0
May							
Jun							
Jul							
Aug							
Sep							
Oct							
Nov							
Dec							
Total	14834	400	1600	0	0	142	3

Data Courtesy: CHP 59

However...WHO cautions

- New diseases (especially when the causative agent is an influenza virus) are often poorly understood when they emerge
- The same virus that causes mild illness in one country can result in much higher morbidity and mortality in another
- The inherent virulence of the virus can change over time as the pandemic goes through subsequent waves of national and international spread.
 - Continuous assessment with more understanding of the disease required





Strategies of Local Government

Public Health Strategies

- Community spread of human swine influenza and the virus has been widely circulating locally
- Moving from the containment phase into the mitigation phase of our strategy
- Aim at relieving disease burden through hygiene measures, social distancing, medical resource mobilization, self-care and other measures.
- Continue to refine the strategy and measures based on latest knowledge and risk assessment to make it sustainable



- Implementation of mitigation measures depends on Epidemic progression
 - Disease severity (indicated by proportion of those infected with complications, requiring hospitalization and case fatality)
 - Burden to medical services, resource capacity
 - Effectiveness of containment
 - Broader considerations in the community

Mitigation measures employed at present

- Activation of 8 Designated Flu Clinics for managing patients with fever and influenza-like illnesses (ILI)
 - Priority would be given to pregnant women, those aged two or below, and high risk groups
 - Tamiflu would only be given to ILI patients with chronic diseases or in immuno-compromised states
- New hospital admission criteria
 - Based on clinical conditions of patients
 - Confirmed patients with mild symptoms would not be required for admission and would be provided with symptomatic treatment



- Focus epidemiological investigations on severely ill patients as well as outbreaks involving schools and institutions
 - Contact tracing for individual cases no longer necessary
- Port health measures
 - Temperature screening, health declarations and broadcast of health messages at the control points would remain unchanged
 - Starting June 29, travelers with mild symptoms and intercepted at all boundary control points would be provided with face mask and guidance notes for seeking medical consultation















Class suspension / early summer breaks for

- All primary schools, kindergartens, child-care centres and special schools
- Secondary schools with confirmed case(s)
- Active promotion and adoption of basic measures on personal and environmental hygiene.
- To further step up the cleansing and environmental hygiene efforts of the community.

Vaccine Strategies

 When available, provision of human swine influenza vaccines for

- healthcare workers in both the public and private sectors
- Children aged > 6 months and below 6 years old
- Elderly persons aged > 65; and
- Persons at higher risk of death and complications from human swine influenza due to pre-existing medical conditions
 - <u>Give elderly aged > 65 pneumococcal and seasonal</u> influenza vaccines for free





What's our role as occupational health and hygiene practitioners?





To be continued... Stay tuned!



MA A02